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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
-vs-
EUGENE MYERS, 
Defendant-Respondent, 
Case No. 16223 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by information with the 
crime of rape in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-402. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Defendant was tried before a jury on December 11 
and 12, 1978, in the Third Judicial District Court in and 
for Salt Lake County, the Honorable Bryant H. Croft, presiding. 
The jury returned a verdict of guilty. At the sentencing 
hearing, Judge Croft arrested the judgment, pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-34-1 and 2. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks an order of this Court reversi~ 
the trial court's arrest of judgment and ordering the trial 
court to sentence the defendant pursuant to the verdict of 
the jury. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On the morning of May 18, 1978, at approximately 
10:00 a.m., defendant approached Susan Delyle and Roberta 
Fresh, both students with defendant in a paralegal trainin~ 
course, in the parking lot of the Utah Technical College 
and asked if he could join them for breakfast (Tr. 41), add: 
that he would buy (Tr. 47). Ms. Delyle and Ms. Fresh 
drove in Ms. Fresh's car to the Hilton where they met t~ 
defendant in the foyer (Tr. 42) . After breakfast, defendai: 
offered to buy drinks at the Watergate, a private liquor 
club (Tr. 43). Defendant, Ms. Delyle, and Ms. Fresh 
proceeded to the Watergate in Ms. Fresh's car, arriving 
at the club at approximately 11:00 or 11:30 (Tr. 43 ). 
Ms. Fresh left the Watergate at 1: 00 to pick up her grand· 
mother from work (Tr. 45), and to change into her work 
clothes. Ms. Fresh was employed as a cocktail waitress at 
a club known as the Iron Horse and changed into a black 
halter dress, mid-thigh length (Tr. 63). Ms. Fresh return;: 
to the Watergate approximately 45 minutes later and join~ 
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defendant and Ms. Delyle. Ms. Fresh and Ms. Delyle remained 
at the Watergate until 3:30, at which time Ms. Fresh drove 
Ms. Delyle to the University of Utah for a ballet lesson. 
Concerning the approximate _four hours that the 
defendant, Ms. Fresh and Ms. Delyle were at the Watergate, 
Ms. Delyle testified at the trial that the three of them had 
lunch and talked (Tr. 46). She further testified that Ms. 
Fresh never kissed defendant (Tr. 46), and that Ms. Fresh 
was not intoxicated (Tr. 51). 
After taking Ms. Delyle to the University of Utah, 
Ms. Fresh returned to the Watergate (Tr. 67), and again 
joined the defendant. At the trial, Ms. Fresh testified 
that she had one more drink (Tr. 69), and for the remainder 
of the evening drank water to avoid becoming intoxicated 
(Tr. 70). Ms. Fresh remained at the Watergate with the 
defendant until it closed at 1:00 or 2:00 a.m. (Tr. 70). 
Ms. Fresh further testified at the trial that she and the 
defendant "talked about law" and danced (Tr. 70). The 
club manager, Mr. James K. Feraco, testified at trial that 
he saw Ms. Fresh lying down in respondent's lap (Tr. 174), 
and that he saw Ms. Fresh and respondent "necking" (Tr. 175) · 
Defendant and Ms. Fresh left the Watergate and 
Ms. Fresh testified she thought she was going to take 
defendant to his car at the Hilton (Tr. 71) · Defendant 
-3-
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asked Ms. Fresh to take him instead to the Holiday Inn on 
North Temple, indicating that he wanted to see someone there 
(Tr. 73). At the Holiday Inn, defendant directed Ms. Pre~ 
to drive to the back part of the parking lot, claiming his 
friend had a room in that particular area (Tr. 74). 
Defendant and Ms. Fresh talked for awhile about law. 
Defendant told Ms. Fresh that she could make better money 
doing something other than cocktail waitressing (Tr. 75), 
indicating that Ms. Fresh could "work" for him as a 
prostitute (Tr. 121), and that, if she would bestow sexual 
favors on him, he would reward her financially (Tr. 121). 
Ms. Fresh testified at the trial that she told defendant she 
"wasn't interested". (Tr. 76). Defendant then asked Ms. Fre' 
if her lack of interest had anything to do with the fact 
that he was Black. She responded that she had "very good 
friends that are Black" (Tr. 77), and she wanted to "keep 
it on that level" (Tr. 77), i.e., friends and no more. 
Defendant became angry (Tr. 77), and yelled at Ms. Fresh 
cal~ing her derogatory names (Tr. 79). Ms. Fresh was 
frightened by defendant's behavior and tried to get out of 
the car (Tr. 81). She grabbed at her keys and tried to 
open the door. Defendant restrained her, also grabbing 
at the keys. The key chain broke (Tr. 82), and the keys 
fell to the floor. Ms. Fresh began to cry and tried 
once more to get out of the car. Defendant pulled her 
-4-
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back into the car by her hair (Tr. 82). Once again, defendant 
became angry and called Ms. Fresh offensive names (Tr. 84). 
At the trial, the following testimony was offered by the 
victim: 
Q. After he pulled you back in by 
your hair, did he release your hair? 
Did he grab a hold of you in any way? 
A. Yeah, he was sort of fumbling, 
trying to fondle my breasts and trying 
to kiss me and he had his arms around 
me. 
Q. Try and describe it and 
explain it better. He pulled you in 
by your hair and what did he do after 
that? 
A. Just grabbed me and was, you 
know--
Q. Was he calling you names while 
he was fondling you or trying to fondle 
you? 
A. Yes, pretty much the same kind 
of names. 
Q. What parts of your body did 
he touch? 
A. At that point in time, just 
my chest. One of his hands was at 
various times on my thigh. 
Q. What did you do while he was 
touching you? 
A. cried and screamed, and "Please 
don' t" , . you know. 
Q. Did you push him or did you 
shove him or did you do anything? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. What did you do? 
A. Pushed and shoved and screamed. 
Q. What areas of Mr. Myers did you 
push on? 
A. Just, I don't know, his shoulders, 
his arms. Q. When you say he tried to kiss 
you, where was he trying to kiss you? 
A. My mouth. 
Q. He wasn't successful? 
A. Yeah. 
-5-
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Q. So what happened after that? 
He got his arms around you and he has been 
fondling and trying to kiss you; what 
happened next? 
A. He was making-- he was saying 
things about he knew that I wasn't sweet 
and innocent and he thought I should 
have intercourse with him. And the 
fondling and the whole bit was still 
going on. 
Defendant then pushed Ms. Fresh down on the seat 
(Tr. 85), pulled up her dress and removed her pantyhose 
(Tr. 87). Defendant pinned Ms. Fresh's hands to the 
seat with his knees and had intercourse with her. Ms. 
Fresh told the defendant to leave. As he left, he warned 
her to keep quiet: 
(Tr. 90). 
A. He started to get out of the 
car and told me that if I told anyone 
about it, he would see to it that--
something about my neck wasn't worth 
a whole lot and he didn't have to do 
anything other than make a phone call 
to see to it. 
After defendant left, Ms. Fresh drove home. Unab:' 
to find her house key and afraid to awaken and upset her 
grandparents with whom she lived (Tr. 91) , Ms. Fresh drove 
to a 7-11 Store nearby and called her girlfriend Julie 
Erickson who told her to come over. Ms. Fresh arrived~ 
her friend's house at approximately 4:45 a.m. and was ~t~ 
the door by Julie Erickson and her husband, Louie Muniz. 
At the trial, Ms. Erickson testified that Ms. Fresh was 
crying and her face and eyes were swollen; her dress was 
-6-
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ripped, "the entire front of her dress was torn open"; 
"a large strip of hair was missing out of the back of her 
head" (Tr. 134); and she had "red marks" on her arm (Tr. 
135). Mr. Muniz, Ms. Erickson's husband, testified at 
trial that Ms. Fresh "looked like she had been roughed'up 
a little bit. Her dress was torn; her hair was kind of messed 
up, had some markings on her arms" (Tr. 142). Ms. Erickson 
called the police and the Rape Crisis Center (Tr. 137). 
In response to Ms. Erickson's call, one James Harrison, a 
police officer employed by Salt Lake City Corporation, 
arrived at the Erickson residence. Officer Harrison testified 
at trial that Ms. Fresh told him she had resisted the 
defendant and tried to get out of the car two times (Tr. 
171). Officer Harrison accompanied Ms. Fresh to Holy Cross 
Hospital where she was examined by Dr. John Geszon. 
Dr. Geszon testified that he found "several areas 
of bruising and scratches" (Tr. 28), and "a tan milky fluid 
specimen in the vagina" upon examining Ms. Fresh. Dr. 
Geszon performed two tests to determine the presence of 
sperm in Ms. Fresh's vagina: The first test, called a "wet 
mount" was performed and no evidence of sperm was present 
(Tr. 34); however, the results of the second test, called a 
"grandstand", showed evidence of sperm in the vagina. 
-7-
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN 
ARRESTING JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-34-1, ET SEQ. 
BECAUSE THE FACTS PROVED AT TRIAL 
CONSTITUTE A PUBLIC OFFENSE AND 
ARE SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN THE 
JURY'S VERDICT OF GUILTY. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-34-1, et seq. provides 
that a motion in arrest of judgment can be made by the 
defendant in a criminal action and that the motion may 
be based, among other things, upon the ground that the 
facts proved do not constitute a public offense. The 
statute further provides that the court on its own view 
of any defects, can arrest the judgment without motion. 
At the sentencing hearing in this case, the 
trial court arrested the judgment pursuant to the above 
statute. While appellant concedes that the trial court 
has the power to arrest judgment in appropriate cases, 
the State contends that the reasons the trial court 
arrested the judgment in this case were insufficient 
and that the decision to arrest judgment was an abuse 
of discretion. 
Appellant's contention that the trial court's 
conduct was an abuse of discretion is based on the 
facts here and case law. A review of the facts shows 
that the major weakness in the trial court's decision 
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was that the judge arrested judgment because of his 
own determination of the credibility of witnesses. 
For example, Judge Croft, addressing the conflicting 
testimonies of the victim and the club manager stated 
at the sentencing hearing that "I think her (the 
victim's] credibility leaves something to be desired 
because I don't think that the manager of the club 
would come in and testify to those facts if they 
weren't in fact true." (Tr.p.110). At that point the 
trial judge invaded the jury's exclusive province 
to evaluate the credibility of witnesses and determine 
the weight of evidence. 
The standard for passing on a motion made 
by the defednant for arrested judgment requires that 
the trial court may not weigh the evidence to determine 
whether the necessary quantum has been produced to 
establish some proof of an element of the crime; the 
trial court may only test or examine the legal sufficiencies 
thereof because the jury is the sole and exclusive judge 
of the weight of the evidence and of credibility of 
witnesses. State v. Randecker, 487 P.2d 1295 (Wash. 1971). 
-9-
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In Randecker, the defendant was found guilt'• 
1 
of second degree forgery and grand larceny by embezzle-
ment. The trial judge granted a motion in arrest of 
judgment and the State appealed. The Supreme Court of 
Washington held that there was substantial evidence 
from which the jury could reasonably have concluded 
there was sufficient proof of the crime and that the 
motion in arrest of judgment should not have been 
granted. The Randecker Court stated: 
••• the [trial] court is only 
empowered to determine whether there 
is "substantial evidence" tending to 
establish circumstances on which a 
necessary element of a crime may be 
predicated. However, whether the 
circumstances tending to connect the 
defendant with the crime, or tending 
to establish intent exclude, to a 
moral certainty, every other reasonable 
hy~othesis than that of the defendant's 
guilt, is again a question for the jury. 
[Citations omitted.] 
Id. at 1299 (emphasis added). 
The court went on to state: 
The fact that a trial or appellate 
court may conclude the evidence is not 
convincing or may find the evidence 
hard to reconcile in some of its aspects, 
or may think some evidence appears to 
refute on negative guilt, or to cast 
doubt thereon does not justify the co~rt~ 
setting aside the jury's verdict. [Cita-
tions omitted. ] 
Id. at 1299 (emphasis added) . 
-10-
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Thus, it is unnecessary, even irrelevant, for 
the trial court to be satisfied of the defendant's 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. It is only necessary 
for it to be satisfied that there is "substantial , 
evidence" to support either the State's case or the 
particular element in question. When that quantum of 
evidence has been presented, there is some proof of the 
element of crime in question and an arrest of judgment 
should not be granted. 
In this case the testimony at trial establishes 
the facts sufficient to constitute a public offense. 
Yet Judge Croft chose to disregard the facts presented 
at trial--chose to reject the jury's conclusions as to the 
evidence and the credibility of witnesses--and made the 
following statement at the sentencing hearing: 
There isn't anybody in this courtroom 
that will ever live to see a more invited 
rape, if there was a rape, than is 
evidence in this case. 
Tr. at 108. 
In a recent Colorado case, the defendant was 
charged with felony menacing and impersonating a police 
officer. The court granted the defendant a judgment of 
acquittal notwithstanding the verdict of the jury. The 
Supreme Court of Colorado held in People v. Noga, 586 
P.2d 1003 (Colo. 1978), that the standard for upsetting 
a jury verdict is very strict and the trial judge may 
-11-
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• • • if a determination of the 
defendant's guilt rests upon the 
credibility of witnesses or the weight 
to be accorded evidence, the case must 
be submitted to the jury, for these 
matters are solely within its province. 
Id. at 1003. 
In this case, the only testimony that 
contradicted the testimony of the victim was that of 
the club manager, Mr. Feraco. Whether the jury believe: 
his testimony or that of the victim and other state 
witnesses, the jury acted within its sole province in 
assessing the credibility of the witnesses to reach a 
decision. 
The trial court in this case did not leave 
the matter of credibility of witnesses or determinatior: 
of the weight of the evidence to the jury. (Only in er 
where the judge tries a case without a jury can he pass 
on the credibility of witnesses. DeVas v. Noble, 369 
P.2d 290 (Utah 1962).) Instead, based on the trial 
judge's disbelief of the victim's testimony, the court 
chose to override the jury verdict and arrest judg~~· 
-12-
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••• as a judge of this court, I 
cannot close my eyes to the fact situa-
tion that for this long period during 
that day these two people were in friendly 
contact [and] association, necking with 
each other and participating in the kind _ 
of activity that ultimately might well lead 
to sexual relations. • 
Tr. at 113. 
Judge Croft further discredited the testimony 
of the victim and stated: 
• • • If she [the victim] had been 
able to get into her grandmother's home, 
I wonder whether or not we would have 
heard anything about this case. I doubt 
it. 
Tr. at 113. 
Judge Croft ignored the evidence presented 
at trial. He ignored the facts which were undisputed 
of the medical examination results and the testimony of 
Dr. John Geszon. He discredited as unbelievable the 
testimony of Susan DeLyle, Julie Ericson, Louis Muniz 
and the victim herself. 
Judge Croft decided that the jury verdict 
could not stand: 
But sometimes juries [sic] make 
mistakes, just as judges make mistakes 
when we have to render judgments in cases 
we try without a jury. None of.us are . 
perfect. And I think that the J~ry verdict 
in this case left much to be desired from a 
point of view of justice under the facts and 
circumstances of the case. 
Tr. at 114 (emphasis added). 
-13-
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Appellant asserts that the trial court's 
action in arresting judgment was an abuse of 
discretion and should be vacated by this Court. 
A. 
THE EVIDENCE IS 
SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE 
CONVICTION OF RAPE. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-402 (Supp. 1977), 
defines the crime of rape as follows: 
A male person commits rape 
when he has sexual intercourse 
with a female, not his wife, 
without her consent. 
Appellant avers that the evidence adduced 
at the trial is sufficient to support the verdict 
of the jury and thus the trial court's arrest of 
judgment was improper and an abuse of discretion. 
The standard used to review the sufficiency 
of evidence was established in State v. Ward, 347 
P.2d 865 (Utah 1959): 
The rules governing the scope of 
review on appeal as to the sufficiency 
of the evidence to sustain the verdict 
are well settled: That it is the 
prerogative of the jury to judge the 
credibility of the witnesses and to 
determine the facts; that the evidence 
will be renewed in the light most 
favorable to the verdict, and that if 
-14-
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whe~ so v~ewed it appears that the jury 
acting fairly and reasonably guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt, the verdict 
will not be disturbed. 
Id. at 869 (emphasis added). 
This Court reiterated that general rule ln 
a recent case, State v. Sharp, P.2d (Utah 
1979), and added that "the question of which testimony 
is to be believed is for the trier of fact and this 
Court will not substitute its own judgment for that of 
the jury unless it is clear that the testimony given is 
completely unbelievable." (Emphasis added.) Citing 
State v. Middelstadt, 579 P.2d 908 (Utah 1978), and 
State v. Wilson, 565 P.2d 66 (Utah 1977). The standard 
for the trial court, however, does not look at whether 
a reasonable person could find the defendant guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt, but only must determine if 
there is sufficient evidence to establish some proof 
of an element of the crime. Thus, in passing on a 
defendant's motion in arrest of judgment or on its 
own motion, the Court cannot weigh the evidence to 
determine whether the necessary quantumhasbeen produced 
because this would invade the province of the jury to 
judge the weight of the evidence; the trial court can 
only test the legal sufficiency of the evidence. Thus, 
if substantial evidence exists as it does in this case, 
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whether the "circumstances tending to connect the 
defendant with the crime or tending to establish 
intent exclude, to a moral certainty every other 
reasonable hypothesis than that of the defendant's 
guilt" is not for the trial judge to determine--it is 
strictly a question for the jury. See State v. Randeck' 
supra. 
The most pertinent issue in judging the 
sufficiency of the evidence in this case is consent. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-406 (1) and (2) defines "without 
consent" as follows: 
An act of sexual intercourse, sodomy, 
or sexual abuse is without consent of the 
victim. • • 
(1) When the actor compels the victim 
to submit or participate by force that 
overcomes such earnest resistance as might 
reasonably be expected under the circumstance' 
or 
(2) The actor compels the victim to 
submit or participate by any threat that 
would prevent resistance by a person of 
ordinary resolution. 
To determine whether a victim consented, this 
Court has looked to her age, strength, surrounding fact: 
State v. Ward, supra, to "threats of immediate and grea: 
bodily harm which create in the mind of the female a 
real apprehension of dangerous consequences," State_!· 
Nunez, 520 P.2d 882 (Utah 1974); to whether she took 
-16-
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advantage of a reasonable opportunity to escape or 
otherwise seek help, State v. Horne, 12 Utah 2d 162, 364 
P.2d 109 (1961); and to the conduct of the victim after 
commission of the assault. State v. Roberts, 91 utah 
117, 63 P.2d 585 (1937). 
A usual occurrence in the trial of a rape 
case is that the defendant's version of what occurred 
differs significantly from the evidence presented by 
the State. In such a situation, this Court has in the 
past accepted the assumption that the jury believed 
that which supports their verdict. See State v. Wilcox, 
28 Utah 2d 71, 498 P.2d 357 (1972); State v. Siddoway, 
61 Utah 189, 211 Pac. 968 (1922). 
In its instructions to the jury, the trial 
court submitted Instruction No. 10 (Record, p. 79), 
which explained "without consent" as defined by 
statute; Instruction No. 12 (Record p. 81), which 
enumerated the four elements of the crime of rape which 
the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt. 
"Reasonable doubt" was defined by this Court in State v. 
Williamson, 22 Utah 245, 62 Pac. 1022 (1900), as: 
••• not a mere imaginary, captious, 
or a possible doubt, but a fair doubt,,based 
upon reason and common sense, and grow~ng 
out of the testimony of the case. It is 
such a doubt as will leave the juror's 
mind, after careful examination of all the 
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evidence in such condition that he cannot 
say that he has an abiding conviction to 
a moral certainty of the defendant's guilt. 
Id. at 1024. 
There is a presumption that the jury wilJ. 
follow the instructions given to them by the court, 
this case, appellant submits the jury weighed the 
evidence according to the instructions given. 
To best establish the sufficiency of the 
evidence it is necessary to explore all elements oft 
crime. 
As to the first element, that respondent hao 
sexual intercourse with the victim, not his wife, the 
following evidence was introduced at trial: the vict 
testified that respondent had intercourse with her ('.: 
p.87); the victim's friend, Julie Erickson, testifiec 
that the victim told her that respondent forced her r 
intercourse (Tr.p.134). Mr. Erickson's husgand, Louis 
Muniz, testified that he had been told by the victim 
that she had been raped (Tr .p .142); and the testimony 
Dr. John Geszon, who testified as to the results of L 
tests which indicated that intercourse had occurred' 
as to the condition of the victim's body. 
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No evidence was presented nor any defense 
raised that the victim was respondent's wife. 
The next element is that such act of sexual 
intercourse occurred without the consent of the victim. 
To prove the element of lack of consent, the following 
evidence was presented at trial: the testimony of the 
victim that she tried on two occasions to get out of the 
car (Tr.p.82); that respondent tore at her clothes and 
pinned her arms down so she could not move (Tr.p.84); 
that she screamed and yelled (Tr.p.84); Dr. Geszon's 
testimony as to the bruises, contusions, etc. on the 
victim's body; and the testimony of those persons who 
had contact with the victim soon after the rape occurred: 
the testimony of Julie Erickson that the victim told 
her she had been raped (Tr.p.134); the testimony of Louie 
Muniz that the victim was upset and crying and looked 
roughed up and had a chunk of hair missing from the back 
of her head (Tr.p.142); and the testimony of the police 
officer who escorted the victim to the hospital (Tr.p.171). 
Recently, in State v. Studham, 572 P.2d 700 
(Utah 1977), this Court held that the evidence was 
sufficient to establish the use of force and the absence 
of consent. In Studham, the prosecutrix and defendant 
had lived together at one time. One night the defendant 
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knocked on the prosecutrix's door but she refused to 
let him in. He kicked the door open and remained in 
the prosecutrix' s apartment for abo1:1t two hours, during 
which time there was "some kissing and amorous advances,' 
At the trial the prosecutrix testified that the defendar.: 
pinned her to the floor during a struggle and "forced 
intercourse upon her against her will." The prosecutrix 
did not scream or attempt to run; her only visible 
injuries were a bruised face and cut lip. The defendant 
argued on appeal that the evidence was insufficient to 
prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and that the 
evidence is "inherently improbable and inconsistent," 
because, although the victim claims force and denies 
consent she did not scream or try to escape. In 
rejecting the defendant's argument in Studham, this Cou:: 
rejected the traditional requirement that the woman 
"must resist to the utmost" and stated: 
Even though it is necessary that the 
rape be against the victim's will, manife~t 
by a determined effort on her part to resist·, 
it is not necessary that it be shown that 
she engaged in any heroics which subjected 
her to great brutality or that she suff~r7d 
or risked serious wounds or injuries (citing 
State v. Ward, supra). 
Id. at 702. 
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See also State v. Horne, 364 P.2d 109 (Utah 1961). 
The Court went on to establish a new standard to 
determine the issue of consent: 
What we think is a sounder view 
recognizes that the bruising and 
terrorizing of the sense and 
sensibilities can be just as real 
and just as wrong as the beating and 
brusing of the flesh;and that the 
law should afford a woman protection, 
not only from physical violence, but 
from having her feelings and sensi-
bilities outraged by force or fear in 
violation of what she is entitled to 
regard and protect as the integrity of 
her person. Accordingly, in determining 
whether the victim's will and resistance 
were overcome, it is appropriate to consider 
that this may be accomplished by either 
physical force and violence, or by 
psychological or emotional stress imposed 
upon her, or by a combination of them. As 
to the degree of resistance required: The 
victim need do no more than her age and 
her strength of body and mind make it 
reasonable for her to do under the 
circumstances to resist. In this case 
there is a reasonable basis in the 
evidence upon which the jury could believe 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the test 
was met. 
Thus, the most critical elements of the 
crime charged, (1) that intercourse did occur with a 
woman not his wife and (2) that it was without the 
victim's consent, are adequately supported by the facts 
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and evidence introduced at trial. The conflicting 
testimony presented by the club manager that the 
victim and respondent were necking does not constitute 
consent. 
In State v. Studharn, supra, the Court 
refers to the "kissing and amorous advances" that 
occurred prior to the rape. Yet this behavior 
does not invite the act nor imply consent. 
Appellant submits that the evidence 
adduced at trial is sufficient to sustain the 
conviction of the respondent. 
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B. 
THE VICTIM'S TESTIMONY 
ALONE, IF NOT UNREASONABLE, IS 
SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE CON-
VICTION OF RESPONDENT. 
In many crimes, the only two persons who can. 
testify about what actually occurred are the victim and the 
perpetrator. It is natural that each version of what 
occurred is significantly different. Nevertheless, many 
courts have noted that in cases of sexual abuse or assault, 
the testimony of the victim alone is sufficient to support 
a conviction. 
The ~rizona Supreme Court has held in State v. 
Williams, 111 Ariz. 175, 526 P.2d 714 (1974), a rape case, 
that: 
A conviction may be had on the 
basis of the uncorroborated testimony 
of the prosecutrix unless the story 
is physically impossible or so in-
credible that no reasonable person 
could belive it. 
Id. at 716-717. 
See also, State v. Hodges, 14 Utah 2d 197, 381 P.2d 81 
(1963), and May v. State, 89 Nev. 277, 510 P.2d 1368 
( 19 73) . 
In the case of State v. Studham, 572 P.2d 700 
(Utah, 1977), this Court stated that where the question of 
guilt or innocence depends upon weighing the credibility 
of the victim against that of the accused: 
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The rule is that if there is 
nothing so inherently incredible 
about the victim's story that 
reasonable minds would reject it, 
a conviction may rest upon her 
testimony alone. 
Id. at 702. 
See also, State v. Ward, 10 Utah 2d, 34, 347 P.2d 867 (1959), 
and State v. Mills, 530 P.2d 1272 (Utah 1975). 
In a recent Wyoming case, Brown v. State, 581 P.2i 
189 (Wyo. 1978), the Supreme Court of Wyoming sustained a 
conviction of rape on the uncorroborated testimony of the 
prosecutrix. In Brown, after the prosecutrix and defendant 
had enjoyed a pleasant dinner together, the prosecutrix 
asked the defendant to take her to her car. The defenda~ 
told her they were "going to Harry's for awhile." The 
prosecutrix told defendant she couldn't stay long. The 
defendant grabbed her arm and pulled her over to him. On 
arriving at Harry's, the defendant pulled her from the car; 
inside the house he pushed her into one of the bedrooms. 
The defendant started tearing at her clothes and pulling 
at her panty hose and underwear. The prosecutrix asked hin 
to stop, but he did not. Not unlike this case, the prosecm 
testified at trial that "she does not have any idea or 
memory of how he got off her dress (Tr.p.125), and further, 
that "she did not scratch, bite, or kick him" because she 
was afraid for her life. The bruises on the 1'.)rosecutrix' 
body were, as here, minimal, but the doctor who examined 
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her found her "very emotionally upset and very distraught." 
The Court determined that the tears in the dress and panty-
hose, together with the bruises and scratches and her 
emotional condition could not be ignored in evaluating the 
evidence. The court differentiated between submission' 
and consent and stated that "acquiescence is not consent if 
induced by fear or reasonable apprehension of bodily harm." 
In the instant case, the victim testified that she told 
the respondent to stop (Tr.p.85), but that he did not do 
so, telling her that she would enjoy it (Tr.p.87 ) . 
The testimony of the victim is not uncorroborated: 
the testimony of Dr. Geszon about her bruises and scratches 
(Tr.p. 28), and the positive results of the tests to 
determine the presence of sperm; the testimony of Julie 
Erickson, Louie Muniz, and Officer Harrison as to the 
victim's emotional state; the evidence of the torn dress 
and ruined pantyhose all corroborate the commission of a 
rape. 
Appellant submits that the testimony of the 
prosecutrix is not unreasonable and, corroborated by 
the testimony of Dr. Geszon, Julie Erickson and Louie 
Muniz, together with the torn dress and pantyhose is 
sufficient to sustain the verdict of the jury and should 
not have been rejected by the trial judge. 
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c. 
IT IS THE EXCLUSIVE PROVINCE 
OF THE JURY TO DETERMINE THE 
CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES. 
It is well-settled in Utah that it is the preroga'. 
of the jury to weigh the evidence and determine the 
credibility of witnesses. See State v. James, 89 P.460 
{Utah 1907); State v. Green, 911 P.987 (Utah 1908). The 
jury may accept or reject all or any part of the witness' 
testimony. People v. Gardner, 530 P.2d 496 (Colo. 1975). 
In this case, the jury received instructions 
regarding the criteria to be used in judging the credibilit; 
of witnesses {see Instruction No. 3, Record p. 72). Usi~ 
the instructions given them, the jury concluded that the 
testimony of the prosecutrix was convincing and credible; 
that the corroborative testimony of Julie Erickson and her 
husband, Louis Muniz, were believable, and that the testirnc: 
of the doctor as to his findings on examination of the 
victim supported the allegation of rape made by the 
prosecutrix and proved by the State. 
When evidence is conflicting, as between the 
testimony of the club manager and the prosecutrix, as to 
events which did or did not occur, the jury as fact finder 
the duty to decide who to believe. State in Interest.£! 
M S_, 584 P.2d 914 (Utah, 1976). There is 
substantial evidence in the trial record for the jury to 
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conclude that the prosecutrix's allegations were 
true and thus reach a verdict of guilty. 
In State v. Harless, 459 P.2d 210 (Utah, 1969), 
this Court held the evidence sufficient to sustain a conviction 
for rape and reviewed the record with the assumption that the 
jury believed those aspects of the evidence which supported 
their verdict. In Harless, as in the instant case, the issue of 
consent was paramount: the defendant claimed that the 
alleged force occurring in such a restrictive space (inside 
the car) was not "only inherently improbable, but physically 
impossible." The Court recognized that neither the victim 
nor the jury saw the facts in the same light as did the 
defendant and stated: 
... it is their [the jury's] 
exclusive prerogative to judge the 
credibility of the evidence and to 
determine the facts; and we do not 
regard the evidence given and the 
verdict rendered as being so in-
herently imp·robable that no reasonable 
minds could so believe, in which event 
we do not disturb them. 
(Citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
Likewise, the trial court should not have arrested 
judgment solely because the trial judge disagreed with the 
conclusions reached by the jury. 
Appellant submits that the trial court erred in 
arresting judgment based on the judge's personal opinion of 
the credibility of witnesses, since that responsibility is 
the exclusive province of the jury. 
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POINT II 
THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE IS 
NOT A BAR TO THE IMPOSITION OF SE~"'rENCE 
PURSUANT TO THE VERDICT OF THE JURY. 
The underlying premise of double jeopardy 
is that a defendant should not be twice tried or 
punished for the same offense. Where there is no 
threat of multiple prosecution the double jeopardy 
clause is not offended. See State v. Allen, 557 P.2d 
176 (Ariz. 1976). 
The United States Supreme Court in United 
States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 95 S.Ct. 1013, 43 
L.Ed.2d 232 (1975), discusses the history and princ~~ 
of the double jeopardy clause. In Wilson, the defe::da:: 
was found guilty by a jury of converting union fu.~ds 
in violation of a federal statute. The Court disnisse: 
the indictment on a post verdict motion. The ~nited 
States Supreme Court held that when a judge rules ~ .. 
favor of the defendant after a guilty verdict has bee~ 
returned by the trier of ::act, the government r:iay a;:;:e;. 
without contravening the double jeopardy clause, s:..:::e 
if the government prevails the ef::ect would be to 
reinstate the guilty verdict and ~here will ~ot be a 
second trial. The Wilson Court stated: 
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Although review of any ruling 
of law discharging a defendant 
obviously enhances the likelihood of 
conviction and submits him to continuing 
expense and anxiety, a defendant has 
no legitimate claim to benefit from an 
error of law when that error could be 
corrected w~thout subjecting him to 
a second trial before a second trier 
of fact. 
Id. at 1023. 
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals in 
a recent Oklahoma case, State v. Robinson, 544 P.2d 545 
(Okla. 1975), stated that an appeal from an order arresting 
judgment may be received by an appellate court and "if 
the trial court's order arresting judgment is incorrect, 
the appellate court may direct the trial court to vacate 
the order in arrest of judgment and sentence the defendant 
in accordance with the law or the verdict of the jury." 
The court went on to state: 
The order in arrest of judgment 
does not operate to discharge the 
defendant nor prohibit pronouncement 
of judgment and sentence. 
Id. at 549. 
Appellant asserts that the granting of an 
arrest of judgment in this case does not operate as an 
acquittal but only places the defendant in the same 
situation he was prior to the prosecution of his case; 
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and the double jeopardy clause is not offended. 
If the relief which appellant seeks on 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-39-4 (1953), 
is denied by this Court, the State will not be 
permitted to bring a second prosecution against 
respondent for the same offense, because there would 
be two trials and two times in jeopardy; however, if 
appellant prevails on appeal, then the case must go 
back to the District Court for sentencing pursuant ~ 
the verdict of the jury. Regardless of the result, 
the double jeopardy clause is not a bar to the State's 
appeal in this case. Respondent would not be tried nor 
punished twice for the same offense; the judgment of 
guilty as determined by the jury will cease to be 
arrested and will be reinstated so that the respondent 
may be sentenced in accordance with the verdict of 
the jury. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant asks this Court to vacate the arrest 
of judgment ordered in the trial court and reinstate the 
jury verdict so that the respondent may be sentenced 
pursuant to statute. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
CRAIG L. BARLOW 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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